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INTRODUCTION
Discussion of the use of military commissions in terrorism prosecutions
no longer dominates the headlines to the same degree as it did during the
early days of the Obama Administration. The debate, however, over
whether military commissions or Article III courts should be the preferred
venue for terrorism prosecutions continues with passionate advocates on
both sides. On one hand, proponents of the Article III court system argue
that the Department of Justice has managed to obtain convictions in nearly
every major case it has brought in civilian court, and the sentences for cases
actually based on terrorism or material support charges have been lengthy.1
Additionally, they argue the slow pace of trial progress in military
commissions, which remains bogged down by various procedural challenges
and open, unresolved constitutional questions, coupled with escalating costs
and perceived lack of legitimacy by outside parties, make military
commissions an increasingly unfavorable venue for terrorism prosecutions.2
On the other hand, proponents of the military commissions system argue
that, even with the many evidentiary and procedural reforms that the
commissions system has undergone to bring its protections close to those
granted by Article III courts, terrorist detainees ought not to be given the
rights that criminal defendants are given in the United States.3 They argue
that military commissions, adhering to the rules promulgated after the
Military Commissions Act of 2009, strike the appropriate balance of due
process on important evidentiary and procedural issues, eliminate the risk

1. See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing
Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 879–
80 (2007) (stating “[o]f the twenty-eight defendants whose [terrorism-related] charges have proceeded
to disposition, twenty have been convicted on at least one [terrorism-related] charge . . . . [T]he mean
[sentence imposed] falls to 80.09 months”).
2. See Devon Chaffee, Military Commissions Revived: Persisting Problems of Perception, 9 U.N.H. L.
REV. 237, 258 (2011) (“[M]ilitary commissions will continue to be dogged by the same continuous
growing pains, missteps, legal uncertainties, and lack of credibility that they have encountered since
2001 . . . . [P]olicymakers [should be prompted] to examine more closely the viability of the
commission system beyond select cases of detainees currently in U.S. custody”).
3. See Michael T. McCaul & Ronald J. Sievert, Congress’s Consistent Intent to Utilize Military
Commissions in the War Against Al-Qaeda and Its Adoption of Commission Rules that Fully Comply with Due
Process, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 595, 605 (2011) (“Congress passed the legislation with the realization that
‘the way to balance the interests of our need to protect ourselves and to adhere to the rule of law is to
apply the law of armed conflict, not criminal law.’” (quoting 152 CONG. REC. 19,973 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
2006) (statement of Sen. Graham)).
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of irrational jurors sabotaging any given case, and significantly mitigate the
risk of unauthorized or inappropriate release of classified information.4
Although this article does not seek to argue for the complete preference
of one system over the other, it does aim to show that on the whole, the
evidentiary advantages for the government in military commissions as
opposed to Article III courts have been greatly overstated by critics of
evidentiary standards for terrorism prosecutions in Article III courts. Given
the existing protections for classified information in Article III courts, and
unclear constitutional foundations for even the slightest departure from
Article III court evidentiary standards, this article argues that, on balance,
Article III courts are just as evidentiarily favorable, if not more so, than
military commissions for terrorism prosecutions at this time.
The first section begins with a discussion of the various Article III courts’
protections for classified information, starting with the Classified
Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), followed by the “Silent Witness”
rule articulated best in United States v. Rosen,5 and closes with an examination
of access to secret exculpatory testimony by terrorism prosecution
defendants in terrorism prosecutions. Next, the article examines some of
the proffered reasons why evidentiary standards for the admission of certain
types of evidence in military commissions are superior to those in Article III
courts, and argues that those advantages may not be as great as they seem
when weighed against some of the evidentiary open questions that remain
unresolved. Finally, the article addresses miscellaneous misconceptions
relating to evidence in Article III courts and concludes with an analysis of
how an understanding of the evidentiary benefits and drawbacks of
Article III courts vis-a-vis military commissions fits into the big-picture
debate on the appropriate forum for terrorism prosecutions.
I. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
A. Classified Information Procedures Act
The Classified Information Procedures Act was passed in 1980 to address
the practice of greymailing, whereby defendants threaten to disclose
classified information during a trial and thereby attempt to coerce the

4. Id. at 643–44.
5. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Va. 2007).
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government into dismissing the indictment or agreeing to a favorable deal.6
In the years following its passage, CIPA has developed into a tool to not
only protect the government against greymailing, but to regulate the
introduction of classified information in Article III trials generally.7 Under
CIPA, as explained in the case of United States v. Lee,8 the procedure for
introducing classified information is as follows:
[T]he defense must file a notice briefly describing any classified information
that it “reasonably expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of” at trial.
Thereafter, the prosecution may request an in camera hearing for a
determination of the “use, relevance and admissibility” of the proposed
defense evidence. If the Court finds the evidence admissible, the government
may move for, and the Court may authorize, the substitution of unclassified
facts or a summary of the information in the form of an admission by the
government. Such a motion may be granted if the Court finds that the
statement or summary will provide the defendant with “substantially the same
ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information.” If the Court does not authorize the substitution, the
government can require that the defendant not disclose classified information.
However, under [Section] 6(e)(2), if the government prevents a defendant
from disclosing classified information at trial, the court may: (A) dismiss the
entire indictment or specific counts, (B) find against the prosecution on any
issue to which the excluded information relates, or (C) strike or preclude the
testimony of particular government witnesses. Finally, CIPA requires that the
government provide the defendant with any evidence it will use to rebut the
defendant’s revealed classified information evidence.9

The rules apply in the same manner if the government wishes to
introduce classified information in a substituted or summarized manner.10
6. See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 89-172A, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA): AN OVERVIEW (1989) (“In 1980 . . . Congress enacted . . . (CIPA) to
provide a means for determining at an early stage whether a ‘disclose or dismiss’ dilemma exists in a
potential prosecution or whether a prosecution may proceed that both protects information the
Executive regards as sensitive to security and assures the defendant a fair trial . . . .).
7. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 632 (“The statute was originally designed to prevent
‘greymail’ by defendants associated with the intelligence community, but is also applicable to all cases
where the government is in possession of or seeks to introduce potentially relevant classified
information.”).
8. United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D.N.M. 2000).
9. Id. at 1325–26 (citations omitted).
10. McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 632–33.
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In such a situation, the government requests a hearing on use, relevance and
admissibility of the evidence, and upon a court finding that the evidence is
indeed admissible, the government may move to introduce a summary or
substituted unclassified information, at which point the court can either
grant the motion, or take one of the three courses of action specified in
Section 6(e)(2).11
As explained by the court in the case of United States v. Lee, a case in which
the defendant was prosecuted on charges of espionage and the mishandling
of classified information after arguing that CIPA’s requirements
compromised his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by forcing him to give
the government advance notice of testimony he may have intended to
present at trial,12 “CIPA is designed to ‘assure the fairness and reliability of
the criminal trial’ while permitting the government to ‘ascertain the potential
damage to national security of proceeding with a given prosecution before
trial.’”13 Citing to the Supreme Court’s observation that “it is obvious and
unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation,”14 the court noted that CIPA serves that interest “by
providing a mechanism for protecting both the unnecessary disclosure of
sensitive national security information and by helping to ensure that those
with significant access to such information will not escape the sanctions of
the law applicable to others by use of the graymail route.”15
It should be noted that while the criticisms received by the Article III
courts for not properly protecting classified information are plentiful,16
criticisms of CIPA as a statute are not. Indeed, in their 2011 article on the
favorability of military commissions over Article III courts as the venue for
terrorism prosecutions, Professor Ronald Sievert and Representative
Michael McCaul concede that not only are “MCA provisions for handling

11. Id.
12. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
13. Id. at 1327–8 (quoting United States v. Ivy, 1993 WL 316215, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12,
1993)).
14. Id. at 1327 (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 34 (D.D.C. 1989)).
15. Id. (quoting Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 34).
16. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 599 (referencing Rep. McCaul’s testimony on the
House floor in 2009); Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2007,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118773278963904523 [https://perma.cc/X7DUVH5K] (discussing several examples where terrorism prosecutions have unintentionally provided
terrorists with a classified information).
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classified information . . . specifically based on CIPA”17 but also that
differences in procedure between the two forums are “picayune, obscure,
and trivial”18 with “virtually no meaningful difference.”19 Their main
argument, and an argument of many who favor military commissions, is that
military judges with experience handling classified information are better
positioned to protect classified information than Article III judges, even if
the rules are the same.20 We will return to this argument later in
section III.B of the paper.
B. “Silent Witness” Rule
In the case of United States v. Rosen, two American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (“AIPAC”) lobbyists, along with a Department of Defense
employee, were charged with violating the Espionage Act for sharing
classified government information with Israeli diplomats and the media.21
Given the highly sensitive nature of the classified information that would be
used in the trial by both parties, the Government sought to apply the Silent
Witness Rule (“SWR”) in addition to conventional CIPA substitutions.22
Although the Government’s first motion to utilize the SWR was denied on
the basis of being overbroad, the Government’s subsequent SWR motion
was successful.23 In its opinion granting the motion, the court explained
the SWR procedure as follows:
[SWR is] a procedure whereby certain evidence designated by the government
is made known to the judge, the jury, counsel, and witnesses, but is withheld
from the public. Under this procedure, a witness referring to this evidence
would not specifically identify or describe it, but would instead refer to it by
reference to page and line numbers of a document or transcript, or more
commonly by use of codes such as “Person 1,” “Country A,” etc. The jury,
17. McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 633.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 635 (crediting military judges as being more “attuned to protecting sensitive sources
and methods, as opposed to a civilian judge who has no experience and may be less understanding of
the tremendous damage that can be caused by the disclosure of certain items of classified
information”).
21. David Johnston, Pentagon Analyst Gets 12 Years for Disclosing Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/politics/pentagon-analyst-gets-12-years-for-disclosingdata.html [https://perma.cc/JB9E-LL2U].
22. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 788 (E.D. Va. 2007).
23. Id. at 796.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss3/2

6

Al-Hendy: Article III Courts v. Military Commissions

2019]

ARTICLE III COURTS V. MILITARY COMMISSIONS

793

counsel, and the judge would have access to a key alerting them to the
meaning of these code designations; the public, however, would not have
access to this key. Any recordings containing the portions designated for
SWR treatment would be played in open court, but would revert to static
when the portions designated to be treated under the SWR are reached; thus,
the public would not hear these portions. At the same time, however, jurors,
counsel, and the judge would listen on headphones to the unredacted
recording. This SWR procedure is in sharp contrast to the CIPA procedure,
which contemplates that any substitutions, summaries, and redactions will be
made available to the public and jury in identical form.24

The first question the court said needed to be resolved was whether CIPA
was intended to occupy the field and preempt any further protection of
classified information.25 After examining CIPA’s legislative history and
case law utilizing the SWR or a similar procedure,26 the court concluded
that CIPA was not intended to occupy the field, and that “the SWR is
precisely the sort of judicially-created fair solution envisioned by Congress”
when it discussed the problems raised by the use of classified information
in trials.27
Next, the court concluded the SWR was not part of CIPA, and since it
constituted at least a partial closure of the trial, the Government was
required to demonstrate the requirements of the Press-Enterprise Company v.
Superior Court of California28 test were met.29 As explained by the court,
Press-Enterprise requires that before a trial may be closed to the public, the
proponent of the closure must demonstrate, and the court must find, (i) that
a compelling interest exists to justify the closure, (ii) that the closure is no
broader than necessary to protect that interest, and (iii) that no reasonable
alternatives exist to closure.30

24. Id. at 793–94 (citing Transcript of CIPA § 6(c) Hearing, United States v. Rosen, 1:05cr225,
94–101 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2007).
25. Id. at 795.
26. See id. at 796 (“[W]hile no court has squarely addressed this precise question, a few courts
have implicitly approved the use of the SWR at trial.”).
27. Id.
28. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
29. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
30. Id.
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These findings must be made on the record, and the court must consider
whether conventional CIPA substitutions would be sufficient in the
circumstances.31 Finally, in the interest of fairness, the use of SWR must
“provide[ ] defendants with substantially the same ability to make their
defense as full public disclosure of the evidence[.]”32 Although the
Government would go on to drop the charges against the AIPAC
defendants,33 bringing the case to an end, Rosen remains a leading case on
how the SWR might be used to protect classified information should the
government find it necessary to take additional precautions.
C. Secret Exculpatory Testimony
In United States v. Moussaoui,34 the Government aimed to prosecute
Zacarias Moussaoui for his role in the 9/11 attacks, and sought the death
penalty on several of the charges brought against him.35 For his defense
against these charges, Moussaoui moved for access to witnesses he knew
were in United States custody, alleging they may be able to offer potentially
exculpatory testimony showing he was not involved in the 9/11 attacks and
as a result should not receive the death penalty.36 The Government
opposed his request.37 The district court found the requested witnesses
were material witnesses to the case, and ordered their deposition by remote
video, but the Government appealed.38 The Fourth Circuit remanded for
the district court to determine whether any substitution existed that would
place Moussaoui in substantially the same position as would a deposition,
but the district court found that there was not, or that at least none of the
Government’s proposed substitutions were sufficient to meet this
requirement.39 When the Government again refused to comply with the
remote video deposition order, the district court dismissed the death notice
and “prohibited the Government ‘from making any argument, or offering
any evidence, suggesting that the defendant had any involvement in, or
31. Id. at 797–98.
32. Id. at 799.
33. Steven J. Rosen, RIGHT WEB, https://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/steven-j-rosen/
[https://perma.cc/JH7T-94KZ].
34. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 457.
36. Id. at 458.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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knowledge of, the September 11 attacks.’”40 The Government promptly
appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit.41
The case on appeal centered on the Sixth Amendment right to
“compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [the defendant’s] favor.”42
The court quickly dismissed the issue of the witnesses not being on
United States soil, stating that the Government’s status as the “custodian”
was sufficient for the district court to be able to compel the Government to
provide the defendant with access to the witnesses.43
The next issue the court addressed was how to deal with the
Government’s claim that the district court’s order would infringe on the
Executive’s war-making authority.44 Here, the court stated that a balancing
of interests must occur.45 Citing to Haig v. Agee,46 as the district court in
Lee did, the court noted that “‘no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security of the Nation,’” and as such, the burden on the
Government is entitled to great consideration.47 However, it also noted
that, given the district court’s correct finding that the witnesses would be
able to offer material evidence in Moussaoui’s favor, Moussaoui had made
a sufficient showing that the evidence would be “more helpful than hurtful”
to his case and had a Sixth Amendment right to some form of the
testimony.48 To resolve these competing interests, the court examined case
law involving “‘constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence’” as well as
the substitution procedures under CIPA, and concluded that the court’s
primary balancing duty consisted of “an examination of whether the district
court correctly determined that the information the Government seeks to
withhold is material to the defense.”49 The court, having already
determined that the evidence was material, affirmed the district court
orders.50 However, unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
40. Id. at 459–60 (citing J.A. (30–4792) 319).
41. Id. at 460.
42. Id. at 463 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
43. Id. at 465–66.
44. Id. at 466.
45. Id. at 469 (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977)).
46. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
47. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 470 (first quoting Haig, 453 U.S. at 307; then citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
48. Id. at 474.
49. Id. at 474, 476 (citation omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988)).
50. Id. at 476.
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CIPA-like substitution was possible.51 The court left the district court to
oversee the exact crafting of substitutions via “an interactive process among
the parties and the district court[,]” with the requirement that the jury be
informed of the nature of the eventual substitution and the limitations under
which they were produced.52
Many have used Moussaoui as an example of a case where military
commissions could have dealt more effectively with the difficulties faced by
Article III courts.53 Judge Brinkema, the district court judge in the case,
even invited the Government to “reconsider whether the civilian criminal
courts are the appropriate fora” for trying someone like Moussaoui,54
although she later made clear in a talk at the University of Virginia School
of Law that she believed Article III courts were well-equipped to take on
the difficulties inherent in terrorism prosecutions.55 But is Moussaoui really
a strong case for this claim?
First, it should be noted that Moussaoui’s very own counsel seemed to
invite a switch to the military commissions system as opposed to the
Article III system, inviting the Government to dismiss the criminal
prosecution against his client and instead to proceed to a military
commission to resolve the tension between Moussaoui’s Sixth Amendment
right and the Government’s war powers.56 One can speculate on some of
the reasons for this strange position by Moussaoui’s counsel; perhaps he
expected the significant delays that would result from the resolution of the
complicated procedural issues in the case would work in his client’s favor,
or that the military commissions, lacking the benefit of extensive case law
on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in Article III courts, might struggle to
ascertain the exact applicability of the Sixth Amendment in the military
commissions setting; or perhaps that the military commissions might be
51. Id. at 480.
52. Id. at 480, 482.
53. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 600 (commenting on the discrepancy between the
level of harm caused by Moussaoui and the actual punishment he was given by the court).
54. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR-01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10,
2003).
55. Doug Kramer, Federal Judge Says Courts Can Handle Gitmo Cases, CLEVELAND NEWS (Apr. 2,
2009, 11:06 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2009/04/federal_judge_says_courts
_can.html [https://perma.cc/QDG9-SPYA].
56. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., Secret Evidence in Criminal Trials, in COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 723,
782 n.4 (3d ed.) (citing Brief of the Appellee at 3–4, United States v. Moussaoui, (4th Cir. May 13,
2003) (No. 03-4162)).
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even more generous than an Article III court would be. Regardless of the
exact reason, the fact that Moussaoui’s counsel did not oppose this switch
of systems is concerning.
Second, at the end of the proceeding, Moussaoui was sentenced to life in
prison without parole, a result which Judge Brinkema applauded for
depriving Moussaoui of the opportunity “to be a martyr and to die in a great
big bang of glory[.]”57 Some have criticized the proceeding for failing to
conclude with a sentence of death for Moussaoui,58 but given that convicted
terrorists like Moussaoui often state that their goal is to die as martyrs, is it
not counterintuitive to see a result that locks them up permanently without
parole as failure? At the very least, regardless of one’s opinion on the
desirability of the death penalty in terrorism prosecutions, it is strange to
not applaud the sentencing of a terrorist to life without parole as a job well
done.
Regardless, returning to the topic of classified information, Moussaoui
demonstrates yet another way in which Article III courts have been able to
adjust to classified information challenges to protect classified information
in terrorism prosecutions. Taken together, CIPA, the SWR, and the Fourth
Circuit’s maneuvering in Moussaoui to protect classified Government
testimony demonstrates that Article III courts are well equipped to protect
classified information that either party may seek to utilize in government
prosecutions.
A couple recurrent criticisms of the protection of classified information
in Article III courts are worth addressing before shifting to an analysis of
the proffered evidence-related reasons for the superiority of military
commissions. Although examples of classified information being leaked out
of a civilian trial are exceedingly rare, two examples are brought up
frequently: 1) the Government releasing a list of unindicted co-conspirators
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trial of Omar Abdel Rahman (the
“blind sheikh”) and others, which included the name of Osama Bin Laden,
and 2) the testimony used by the Government in its trial of Ramzi Yousef
for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as well as other
bombings, to indicate they had gathered information on him and other
57. Benjamin Weiser, Tirade Offers Insight on Would-Be Bomber, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/nyregion/06shahzad.html
[https://perma.cc/JGQ7VYBG].
58. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 598 (“[A] signal [was sent] by this administration that
the war on terror is over, that we are no longer going to treat terrorists as enemies of war . . . .”).
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terrorists he spoke with via cell-phone tracking.59 In both cases, the
information made its way back to Al Qaeda members, who were then able
to adjust accordingly and cut off channels of highly valuable intelligence for
the United States.60 Regrettable as those disclosures may have been, they
were not instances in which a judge failed to protect classified information
or where a defendant was able to utilize the system to place the government
in a compromising position with no options. Rather, they were instances in
which the government, through prosecutorial error, failed to exercise the
protections available to it to ensure that the classified information needing
protection was indeed protected.61 Further, as explained in this section,
even more methods now exist—via the SWR or Moussaoui—for the
protection of classified information that may have caused Article III courts
greater difficulty in the past.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN MILITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Advantages (On Paper)
It would be factually incorrect to not concede, at least on paper, that
military commissions seemingly bear some advantage helpful to Article III
courts in terrorism prosecutions. For example, hearsay rules are drafted in
a manner that provides military judges with more discretion to decide what
hearsay evidence may be allowed into the proceeding than Article III judges
have.62 The 2009 Military Commissions Act (MCA) Section 949a(b)(3)(D)
provides:

59. See Mukasey, supra note 16 (noting two prominent examples of leaked classified information
from a trial).
60. See id. (addressing the classified information provided to al Qaeda members).
61. See Dahlia Lithwick, Holder Laughed: The Attorney General Tries to Sell Us on New York Terror
Trials, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2009, 6:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/11/the-attorneygeneral-tries-to-sell-us-on-new-york-terror-trials.html [https://perma.cc/4EWY-37AK] (discussing
Attorney General Eric Holder’s contention that it was the fault of federal prosecutors in failing to
pursue protective orders that resulted in a list of co-conspirators of a suspected terrorist to remain
unclassified); see also EDITORIAL: Obama and Gitmo, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2008),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/12/obama-and-gitmo/
[https://perma.cc/
THZ5-3ZZK] (“[T]he U.S. courts gave al Qaeda valuable information about which of its agents had
been uncovered.”).
62. McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 618–21 (highlighting the increased level of discretion
military judges possess in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence).
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(D) Hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the [traditional] rules
of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial may be admitted in a
trial by military commission only if—
(i) the proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party,
sufficiently in advance to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to meet the evidence, the proponent's intention to offer the evidence, and
the particulars of the evidence (including information on the circumstances
under which the evidence was obtained); and
(ii) the military judge, after taking into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the taking of the statement, including the degree to which the
statement is corroborated, the indicia of reliability within the statement
itself, and whether the will of the declarant was overborne, determines
that—
(I) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(II) the statement is probative on the point for which it is offered;
(III) direct testimony from the witness is not available as a practical
matter, taking into consideration the physical location of the witness, the
unique circumstances of military and intelligence operations during
hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or intelligence operations
that would likely result from the production of the witness; and
(IV) the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.63

Although Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) provides judges
with almost the same residual exception to consider hearsay that does not
fit into the twenty-five or so specific exceptions to hearsay provided in Rules
803 and 804,64 the reality is that judges are highly reluctant to use it, given
the legislative history stating that it should be used “very rarely and only in
exceptional circumstances” and the case law that cites to this history.65
Another advantage enjoyed by military commissions—with respect to the
admission of evidence—is in the greater discretion to accept evidence with

63. Id. at 619 (quoting Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat.
2574, 2582 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(D) (Supp. III 2009))).
64. FED. R. EVID. 803–04 (listing the exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
65. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 621 (noting the trial court’s fear of appellate reversal
that follows the application of the residual exception).
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an imperfect chain of custody than judges in Article III courts have. Per
Military Commissions Rule (MCR) 949a(b)(3)(C):
(C) Evidence shall be admitted as authentic so long as—
(i) the military judge of the military commission determines that there
is sufficient evidence that the evidence is what it is claimed to be; and
(ii) the military judge instructs the members that they may consider any
issue as to authentication or identification of evidence in determining the
weight, if any, to be given to the evidence.66

Whereas Article III judges are bound by FRE Rule 901(a), which requires
the prosecution to make a strong showing of authenticity in presenting or
introducing evidence,67 military commission judges are empowered (on
paper) to instruct the panel of members ruling on the defendant’s case to
give the appropriate weight to the evidence when it is admitted, rather than
being forced to exclude it entirely.
B. Additional Obstacles
While there are some clear evidentiary advantages military commission
judges seem to have over Article III judges, challenges make the work of
military commission judges very difficult and continue to handicap their
ability to resolve pending cases in a timely manner. While these challengers
are varied in nature, they center around one issue: uncertainty.
Consider, for example, the application of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to hearsay testimony in military commissions. In the
prosecution of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, alleged to be the mastermind
behind the 2000 USS Cole bombing, al-Nashiri asked the judge in pre-trial
motions to take judicial notice that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, providing the constitutional right of a defendant to be
confronted with the witnesses to be used against him,68 does apply to
military commissions.69 While some have argued with varying degrees of
66. Id. at 623 (emphasis added) (quoting Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11184, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2574, 2582 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(C) (Supp. III 2009))).
67. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
68. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (analyzing the protections provided by the
Confrontation Clause).
69. Christina M. Frohock, Military Justice as Justice: Fitting Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence into
Military Commissions, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 255, 256–57 (2014).
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certainty that it does not,70 others have noted that there are arguments to
be made that it does. For example, some have posited that the Obama
Administration’s acceptance of Additional Protocol I71 as customary
international law, and particularly Article 75, which grants defendants the
“right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf,”72 may have
unintentionally extended the application of the Confrontation Clause, or at
least its protections, to defendants in military commissions proceedings.73
Given that thus far the Trump Administration has not undone this
Executive Order, this remains an open question.
Al-Nashiri’s own argument is that Boumediene74 and Hamdan II75 favor
broad constitutional application to Guantanamo cases, and thus the
Confrontation Clause should be extended to military commissions.76 While
some may believe that both of these cases clearly limited their scope on
constitutional protections to the specific clauses that they were discussing—
i.e. the Suspension Clause and Ex Post Facto Clause—the fact remains that
almost four years on, this too remains an open question.
Consider next the controversial case, United States v. Ghailani,77 where the
Government sought to use the testimony of a witness whom the
Government had obtained only through information it had gained from the

70. See id. at 257 (explaining how testimonial statements are inapplicable for military
commissions); Michael T. McCaul & Ronald J. Sievert, Congress’s Consistent Intent to Utilize Military
Commissions in the War Against Al-Qaeda and Its Adoption of Commission Rules that Fully Comply with Due
Process, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 595, 624 (2011) (“The Supreme Court and appellate courts have noted that
Crawford does not generally apply where statements have been taken in emergency situations . . . .”).
71. Robert Chesney, Cully Stimson on Art. 75 and Its Implications for Hearsay in Military Commissions,
LAWFARE (Mar. 10, 2011, 10:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cully-stimson-art-75-and-itsimplications-hearsay-military-commissions [https://perma.cc/KS3Z-PE6E] (“[I]t is the policy . . . of
[the Department of Defense] to comply with Article 75 [of Additional Protocol I].”).
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
73. Chesney, supra note 71 (positing that Article 75 of API “gutted the relaxed rules on the
admission of hearsay”).
74. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (applying the full effect of the U.S.
Constitution’s Suspension Clause to Guantanamo Bay detainees).
75. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
76. Wells Bennett, June 11 Session #7: “It’s All Hearsay”, LAWFARE (June 11, 2013, 2:39 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/june-11-session-7-its-all-hearsay [perma.cc/7T47-BHLP].
77. United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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defendant by physical and psychological coercion.78 Although Ghailani was
sentenced to prison, the outcome was decried as a “total miscarriage of
justice”79 after the district court had ruled that the testimony obtained
through coercion could not be used and the jury convicted Ghailani on one
count of conspiracy to commit murder while acquitting him on 280
others.80 Yet, successes of the Article III court system in obtaining a life
sentence expediently and without leaks of classified information aside, the
Judge Kaplan himself noted that the idea that the testimony would not have
been excluded in a military commission was questionable:
It is very far from clear that Abebe’s testimony would be admissible if Ghailani
were being tried by military commission, even without regard to the question
whether the Fifth Amendment would invalidate any more forgiving
provisions of the rules of evidence otherwise applicable in such a
proceeding. . . . [These rules] preclude or restrict the use of “statements
obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,” and evidence
derived therefrom, and could require exclusion of Abebe’s testimony. Even
if they did not, the Constitution might do so, even in a military commission
proceeding.81

At best, considering Judge Kaplan’s explanation in Ghailani, this would be
another open question that would need to be resolved, and likely would be
subjected to appeal by the defense should a military commission judge find
that the constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment “fruits of the
poisonous tree” doctrine82 are inapplicable and the rules of evidence of the
military commissions do not bar this type of evidence.

78. Id. at 264.
79. Editorial, The Ghailani Verdict, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/19/opinion/19fri1.html [perma.cc/2R5P-5EGW].
80. Charlie Savage, Terror Verdict Tests Obama’s Strategy on Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/nyregion/19detainees.html [perma.cc/E9CW-EFJG].
81. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88 n.182.
82. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 278 (1983) (“When an incriminating statement
has been obtained through coercion, the Fifth Amendment prohibits use of the statement or its
‘fruits.’”).
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III. MISCELLANEOUS MISCONCEPTIONS/ISSUES
A. Miranda & Quarles in Terrorism Prosecutions
A significant criticism of Article III courts in terrorism prosecutions that
has persisted is that the constitutional requirement of advising defendants
of their Miranda rights upon arrest has hampered the success of terrorism
prosecutions by forcing federal agents and military officers to immediately
inform a defendant of his Miranda rights upon arrest.83 A related criticism
is that although a public safety exception may exist to Miranda,84 the
circumstances for its use remain ambiguous and confusing for federal agents
and military officers.85
These criticisms are invalid and unfair for a number of reasons. First,
guidance for federal agents on the use of the public safety exception is
available in clear terms in the Department of Justice and FBI’s document
titled “Custodial Interrogation for Public Safety and Intelligence-Gathering
Purposes of Operational Terrorists Inside the United States.”86 This
document lays out the procedure to follow when interrogating any
“operational terrorists,”87 along with the factors to weigh in deciding when
or if to present an arrestee with his Miranda warnings and when to cease
questioning.88 While this document is not binding on the courts, it is nearly
binding on federal agents and should leave them with little confusion on
how to carry out their responsibilities when interrogating a terrorism
arrestee.89

83. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 599 (disagreeing with the application of Miranda rights
to suspected terrorists).
84. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984) (distinguishing cases in which the
public safety exception did not apply).
85. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 627–28 (describing the lack of clarity for when the
public safety exception would apply).
86. Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel to All Field Offices of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
87. The term is defined in the document as “an arrestee who is reasonably believed to be either
a high-level member of an international terrorist group; or an operative who has personally conducted
or attempted to conduct a terrorist operation that involved risk to life; or an individual knowledgeable
about operational details of a pending terrorist operation.” Id. at 2 n.2.
88. Id. at 2–3.
89. See id. at 1 (“This Electronic Communication provides guidance regarding the use of Miranda
warnings for custodial interrogation of operational terrorists who are arrested inside the United
States.”).
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Second, the decision to admit statements of the accused must always be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Even the 2009 MCA rules on statements
of the accused call for an analysis of voluntariness based on different factors,
as well as an overall “totality of the circumstances” evaluation of the
reliability of the evidence.90 Notably, Article III parties and courts have the
benefit of developed case law in Quarles91 to help guide the inquiry into what
qualifies for the public safety exception of Miranda. In contrast, military
commissions, with their short history and limited case law, do not have a
similar resource to draw upon for guidance.92
Finally, case law has become increasingly favorable towards a broadly
flexible standard for the Quarles public safety exception in terrorism
prosecutions. Consider the case of United States v. Abdulmutallab,93 the case
of the “underwear bomber” who attempted to ignite explosives concealed
in his underwear while abroad Northwest Flight 253 as it approached
Detroit.94 There, Abdulmutallab argued that his fifty-minute conversation
at the University of Michigan Hospital should be suppressed because federal
agents did not inform him of his Miranda rights until after the
conversation.95 The court disagreed, citing to both Sixth Circuit and
Second Circuit precedent applying Quarles.96 The court went on to explain
that the primary inquiry was whether the questions asked were calculated to
obtain information that would help secure the safety of the public, and given

90. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2574, 2580
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c)–(d) (Supp. III 2009)).
91. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
92. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 630 (“Considering the exact wording of the [Military
Commission] rule, the statement would be admissible whether it reflected an immediate threat or
related to a future threat . . . . As such, the rule does not fit the exact language of Quarles.” (footnote
omitted)).
93. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16,
2011).
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id. at *3.
96. Id. at *5. Both Second Circuit cases were terrorism prosecutions. See In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 215 (2d. Cir. 2008) (upholding the convictions
of two defendants based on their involvement in the bombing of two U.S. Embassies in Africa in part
because “[t]he inculpatory statements of [the defendants] obtained overseas by U.S. agents were
properly admitted at trial”); United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding the
police’s questioning “about the construction and stability of the bombs” valid under the public safety
exception).
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that that was clearly the federal agent’s primary motive, it fell squarely within
the Quarles exception.97
B. Article III Judges v. Military Judges
As mentioned earlier, one of the most significant reasons proponents of
military commissions offer for their support of the system is the use of
military judges as opposed to Article III judges.98 Some of the reasons
offered for this preference are that Article III judges often “appear reluctant
to admit certain categories of evidence, even when that evidence is actually
admissible under civilian rules” and “often have neither national security nor
military experience[.]”99 Additionally, according to proponents of military
commissions, “rogue or irrational jurors are more likely to be encountered
in civilian juries . . . as opposed to military juries where panel members are
military officers who are chosen because of an established record and
reputation for good judgment.”100
In a sense, the debate over Article III judges versus military judges can
sometimes function as a microcosm of the debate over the use of Article III
courts versus military commissions in terrorism prosecutions. As such,
many of the arguments made earlier with regards to the admissibility of
evidence and the protection of classified information can be cross-applied
here. As previously mentioned, the Government has multiple mechanisms
through which to ensure the protection of classified information,101 and
has a strong record of doing so even when an Article III judge lacks
extensive military or national security experience.102 Additionally, while the
admission of evidence in certain cases may be more relaxed (on paper), in
other cases, such as the recently discussed admissions and statements of the
accused, Article III courts are just as relaxed, if not more so.103

97. Abdulmutallab, 2011 WL 4345243, at *6.
98. See, e.g., McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 638 (“As an experienced government attorney,
the author readily acknowledges the preference of trying a case before a military commission rather
than a civilian court . . . .”).
99. Id at 638–39.
100. Id. at 639.
101. See id. at 632 (“CIPA requires the defendant to advise the court beforehand if he intends
to introduce classified information and allows the Government to meet with the court ex parte before
trial to review classified information that may be material or subject to rules of discovery.”).
102. See id. at 634 n.189 (listing cases upholding the ex parte review of classified information).
103. See id. at 634 (“Civilian appellate courts have rejected defendants’ assertions that they
should participate in pretrial determinations of the discovery of classified information.”).
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But even accepting that military judges do have the benefit of more
experience and more relaxed rules, the problem of massive uncertainty
makes their work far more difficult than that of Article III judges. First,
there is the problem of lack of precedent in trying domestic offenses, as
Professor Steve Vladeck explains:
As al Bahlul helpfully explains, when it comes to precedent for trying domestic
offenses in law-of-war military commissions, there isn’t exactly a whole lot of
reliable precedent—which is to say, there isn’t any. As a result, in case after
case, the military commission’s trial judges have had to reinvent the wheel on
legal issues ranging from the mundane to the momentous. . . . Whether one
thinks al Bahlul is rightly decided or not, it’s not as if the current crop of
military judges has any experience presiding over military commission trials of
domestic offenses (as compared to their Article III brethren, who, as
Judge Tatel pointed out in his concurrence, have loads of such experience).104

Second, there are still few clear answers on the application of most of the
Constitution’s provisions and protections on military commission
proceedings. A 2011 article previewing the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
military commission proceeding highlighted these issues:
Does the requirement of an impartial jury in the Sixth Amendment apply?
Does the entirety of the Sixth Amendment apply? Does the Fifth
Amendment apply? Are certain crimes legally triable by military commission?
I do not purport to know the answers to these questions. While the answers
to these questions are unknown, they must be answered before the 9/11 trial
proceeds. However, that is unlikely.105

Although some Article III judges have shown the ability to handle
terrorism prosecutions well, and have now built up national security
experience on par with judges in the military commissions system, it is fair
to note the advantages of military judges make them appear more favorably

104. Steve Vladeck, Why I Don’t “Trust” the Military Commissions (And You Shouldn’t Either . . .),
LAWFARE (June 24, 2015, 3:21 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-i-dont-trust-militarycommissions-and-you-shouldnt-either [perma.cc/R4VR-CH2L].
105. Jonathan Tracy, The Real Problem with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Military Commission, 38 HUM.
RTS. 14, 14 (2011); see also Vladeck, supra note 104 (discussing the “unclear constitutional foundation”
of the military commissions at present, and highlighting the Eighth Amendment as another potential
constitutional roadblock for military commissions).
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positioned to handle certain cases.106 Unfortunately, however, given the
amount of uncertainty that persists in the military commission system, it is
very difficult to say, on a macro level, that those advantages outweigh the
disadvantages that currently plague the military commission system.
IV. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the purpose of this article is not to assert that
military commissions should not have a role to play in the way the United
States prosecutes those accused of terrorism. Indeed, under current law,
there are several alleged terrorists who cannot be prosecuted in any venue
other than military commissions.107 And even some of the most critical of
military commissions concede that when it comes to international war
crimes, military commissions are better situated to handle those cases.108
Rather, the purpose of this paper is simply (1) to correct the narrative
regarding Article III court’s handling of classified information, and (2) to
make clear that on the question of the admissibility of evidence, the
advantages that military commissions hold over Article III courts are not as
superior as they are often made to seem.
Additionally, before the publication of this article, the DC Circuit handed
down In re Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri,109 commonly
referred to as Al-Nashiri III. The opinion discusses the non-recusal of
Judge Spath and the harmful impact that this error had on proceedings.110
While the opinion does not focus on the admissibility of evidence or the
protection of classified information, it is yet another example of the many
issues and uncertainty that the military commissions system is fraught with
while also reinforcing this article’s conclusion that Article III courts are the
significantly superior forum for terrorism prosecutions at this time.
As for the big picture, it is important to note that there are other nonevidentiary questions still unresolved in the military commission system,
106. See McCaul & Sievert, supra note 3, at 635 (discussing how military judges are more
receptive to protecting classified information).
107. See Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Al Nashiri II, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:38 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-al-nashiri-ii [perma.cc/A7AS-9CWB] (“Al Nashiri cannot be
tried in federal court, because he cannot be brought to the U.S. for trial.”).
108. See Vladeck, supra note 104 (“[T]ruly understanding war crimes requires a keen
understanding of—if not experience in—war itself, something Article III courts—and their juries—
often lack.” (emphasis omitted)).
109. In re Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri, No. 18-1279, 2019 WL 1601994,
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
110. Id. at *1.
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such as whether military commissions can try non-international war crimes,
whether they can try pre-9/11 crimes, and whether their jurisdiction can be
extended to citizens. These questions are likely to continue to delay bringing
terrorists in the military commissions to justice.
As such, for cases involving non-international war crimes, it would be
wise to utilize the Article III courts to dispose of the majority of terrorism
prosecution cases until the many open questions in the military commissions
system are resolved. Article III courts, though far from perfect in their
record with terrorism prosecutions, have shown the ability to bring terrorists
to justice and protect classified information at the same time. Hopefully, in
the near future, as the military commission system resolves more of the
constitutional and procedural questions it currently faces, it will be able to
take on a larger role in terrorism prosecutions and become a fair and
efficient forum for bringing certain terrorists to justice alongside the
Article III court system.
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